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Abstract 
Under EU Air Passenger Rights legislation (“EC261”), carriers must provide assistance and cash 
compensation to passengers in case of long delay. We study whether the regulation reduces flight delay. 
EC261 applies uniformly to flights departing from the EU, but covers only EU carriers on EU–bound 
flights. Exploiting this variation, we find that regulated flights are 5% more likely to arrive on time, and 
mean arrival delay is reduced by almost four minutes. The effect is strongest on routes with little 
competition, and for legacy carriers. Thus, consumer rights can improve quality when incentives from 
competition are weak. 
Keywords 
Flight delays, service quality, regulation, EC261/2004, consumer protection. 
JEL: L51, L93, K23, D22, L15, D18 
  1 
Introduction* 
Flight delay is a persistent quality problem in the airline industry, which has not been resolved by 
competition (Ater and Orlov, 2015). Soft-touch regulations, such as the US delay disclosure program, 
appear to have encouraged gaming (Forbes et al., 2015) rather than service improvement. At the same 
time, while three-quarters of delay minutes are caused by airline operations or late arriving aircraft, 
passengers are often left to bear the burden when a delay occurs – be it in terms of inconvenience, lost 
time or incremental expenses.1 This paper studies the pioneering EU Air Passenger rights regulation 
(“EC261”), which makes airlines liable for providing assistance and compensation to passengers in case 
of long delay. Our main objective is to identify to what extent this liability encourages airlines to 
improve punctuality. 
This paper provides robust evidence that the European air passenger rights regulation (EC261) is 
effective in reducing average flight delay. Our main estimate reveals an average treatment effect of the 
regulation of nearly 5 minutes of departure delay reduction. This impact is clearly economically 
important in magnitude compared to a population average delay of around 12 minutes,2 and is 
independent of airlines’ decisions on scheduled flight duration. Statistically, the hypothesis of no impact 
can be very firmly rejected. The results hold for other measures of flight punctuality (arrival delay and 
share of “on-time flights”), and is robust to alternative specifications. Moreover, we find that the 
regulation is most effective at delay reduction on routes where competition is low.  
Our identification strategy exploits within–route variation in regulatory coverage based on the 
country of origin of the carrier. This arises from the partial extra–territorial application of the European 
passenger rights regulation on extra-EU routes (i.e. routes connecting an airport in the EU with an airport 
outside of the EU). All flights departing from an airport inside the EU are covered. On routes originating 
outside, only flights operated by EU carriers fall under the regulation; here, we observe flights that are 
covered and not covered operating on the same route and scheduled around the same time. This makes 
it possible to identify the impact of the regulation while allowing for carrier fixed effects and controlling 
for route-time effects (e.g. caused by airspace congestion). 
These findings have four important implications for the literature. First, EC261 is an example of a 
policy successful in reducing airline delay; prior research on US regulations generally found them to 
ineffective in addressing delay. Forbes et al. (2015) study how airlines respond to incentives to “game” 
the US Department of Transportation (DOT) on-time market transparency program. Under the program, 
a flight is classified as on-time if delay is less than 15 minutes; this creates particularly strong incentives 
to reduce reported delay when a flight is expected to have a delay just above this threshold.3 In a follow-
up paper, Forbes et al. (2018) observe impact of the transparency program on average delay reduction, 
which however is a result of increased scheduled duration, not an improvement from flight operations. 
Relatedly, Fukui and Nagata (2014) study the DOT’s tarmac delay rule, which penalizes airlines holding 
                                                     
* We thank Itai Ater, Ricard Gil and Holger Strulik for their insights. Seminar participants in Göttingen, Hannover and 
Warsaw as well as at the Nineteenth CEPR/JIE School and Conference on Applied Industrial Organisation provided helpful 
comments. Funding from the German Science foundation is gratefully acknowledged (Gnutzmann). Thanks also to an 
unnamed non-EU carrier, whose long delay on a flight to the EU provided the initial inspiration for the project. 
1 See Ball et al. (2010) 
2 This is true in both the US and Europe. See Eurocontrol (2007) and Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ on-time 
performance database. 
3 Forbes et al. (2015) find that airlines which self-report their delay time misreport arrival times for flights arriving just after 
the 15 minute threshold. Second, some airlines operate employee bonus programs that reward performance according to 
the DOT ranking; these have similar threshold effects even with automatic reporting. This suggests that flights at risk of 
missing the 15 minute mark may be marginally accelerated. These findings show that the DOT program is subject to gaming 
at threshold. 
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passengers on the tarmac for more than three hours with considerable fines (up to $27,500 per 
passenger). They likewise find evidence consistent with gaming: flights at risk of long tarmac delay may 
be canceled, and the introduction of the rule may have caused longer gate departure delay. 
Secondly, our results provide some empirical evidence on possible positive effects of consumer 
protection law. As highlighted in the literature on behavioral industrial organization (surveyed in 
Heidhues and Kőszegi (2018)), consumers may not fully take into account contingencies that are 
unlikely ex ante when making a purchase decision; for example, they may fail to realize the costs they 
could face in case of a long flight delay. In this case, making insurance mandatory can protect 
consumers. As our results show, such a regulation can have broader benefits by encouraging firms to 
increase average quality. At the same time, the trade-off for these benefits is a reduced freedom of 
contracts.  
Third, our results provide further evidence of low marginal costs of airline delay reduction. The 
provisions of EC261 apply to flight delays exceeding three hours, which occur on around 0.5% of flights; 
hence, expected costs of the regulation for any given flight must be low. At the same time, we find large 
average effects of delay reduction. These results are consistent with Nicolae et al. (2016), who consider 
the delay reduction impact of introducing checked baggage fees. Charging for baggage may reduce the 
number of baggage items passengers carry, reducing utilization of ground services and making plane 
loading faster (they refer to this as the “below-the-cabin effect”). Nicolae et al. (2016) find that carriers 
introducing baggage fees saw a median reduction in departure delay of 3.3 minutes relative to competing 
carriers that did not. 
Fourth, passenger rights lead to stronger delay reductions on routes where competition is low. Theory 
shows that the relationship between competition and quality is ambiguous, and the empirical evidence 
is consistent with this. Mazzeo (2003) shows that delays fall when a route moves from a monopoly 
carrier to duopoly, while Ater and Orlov (2015) show increased competition due to Internet penetration 
worsens on-time performance. Similarly, Prince and Simon (2014) find that (actual or threatened) entry 
by Southwest, a low-cost airline, worsens incumbent on-time performance.4 In our model, these route-
level delay effects are captured by the route-time fixed effect, allowing us to focus on the interaction 
between the effect of the regulation and route competition. Our results show that EC261 leads to stronger 
delay reduction when market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is high. 
The paper continues by introducing the EU Air Passenger Rights regulation the following section. 
Section 2 then discusses our identification strategy, addressing both specification and the sources of 
variation we exploit; this is followed by the data description. Section 4 presents the key results on delay 
impact, followed by a discussion of the underlying mechanisms in section 5. Lastly, section 6 concludes. 
1. EU Air Passenger Rights Regulation 
Air passenger rights in the European Union are laid down in Regulation 261/2004 (henceforth EC261). 
With the aim of “ensuring a high level of protection for passengers”, the regulation grants passengers 
certain rights against the carrier operating the flight,5 should certain liability events6 arise. The regulation 
is mandatory, so passengers and airlines cannot agree through conditions of carriage to limit or waive 
rights created by the regulation. Of central interest in this paper are passenger rights in case of flight 
delay. The regulation is concerned with “long delays” in arrival at the final destination exceeding three 
hours. Thus, missed connecting flights qualify as a reason for long delay. In case of a long delay, 
passengers have a right to care and assistance. This includes free phone calls, meal vouchers and – in 
case of overnight stays – hotel accommodation, which must be fully covered by the operating carrier. 
                                                     
4 In Europe, LCC entry may improve on-time performance (Bubalo and Gaggero, 2015). 
5 The operating carrier is always liable under the regulation, irrespective if the ticket was sold through another carrier. 
6 Denied boarding, flight cancellation or long delay 
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Such care must always be granted, irrespective of who is at fault for the delay. Additionally, passengers 
receive the right to claim substantial cash compensation for lost time, which is due unless the airline can 
prove the delay was caused by “exceptional circumstances”.7 This compensation ranges from EUR 250 
for a three-hour delay on a short flight of less than 1500km to EUR 600 for a delay of at least four hours 
on a long-haul flight with distance exceeding 3500km (see appendix table 3 for details). Reflecting the 
motive of compensation, these cash payments are not limited by the ticket price; thus, the airline may 
well need to refund more than 100% of the ticket price in case of long delay. Figure 1 summarizes these 
remedies under the EC261 regulation. 
Figure 1: EC261 Passenger Rights: The Case of Long Delay 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Bobek and Prassl (2016) and European Union (2016) 
Coverage of the regulation is broad but not universal. All flights departing from an airport located in the 
European Union8 fall under the scope of EC261. The situation is more interesting for routes headed to 
an EU-airport but originating outside the EU. On such routes, flights operated by a carrier from an EU 
member state must grant EC261 passenger rights. But flights operated by non-EU carriers are under no 
such obligation. And in practice, non-EU carriers also do not voluntarily grant equivalent passenger 
rights on these routes. This quirk in coverage, summarised in Figure 1, will be fundamental for 
identification, as described in section 2.  
EC261 was significantly shaped over time by case law and implemented gradually against the 
continued opposition of airlines. This is particularly true for delay compensation. The original text of 
the regulation explicitly rules out cash compensation for delay, reserving it for the case of flight 
cancellation. However, in the controversial landmark Sturgeon case9 (Garben, 2013), the European 
Court of Justice in 2009 determined that a long delay has an effect equivalent to a cancellation, and 
accordingly compensation should be paid. This ruling thus drastically broadened the scope of EC261 
compared to earlier practice. However, public awareness of passenger rights was initially low, leading 
few passengers to make the claims they were entitled to (European Commission, 2014). It also met fierce 
resistance from airlines, who initially refused to apply the ruling to those few passengers that did seek 
                                                     
7 Perhaps the most well known case which brought the EC261 regulation into the spotlight was the volcano ash clouds 
following the Eyjafjallajökull eruptions in spring 2010. 107,000 flights were canceled during an 8-day period following the 
eruption, accounting for 48% of total air traffic in EU and roughly 10 million passengers. The ash-cloud is treated as an 
extraordinary circumstance, so airlines were exempt from disbursing cash compensation. The airlines, however, were 
obliged to provide care, including accommodation and food, for the affected passengers. 
8 Additionally, some non-EU countries also apply the regulation. Examples include Switzerland and Norway. When we talk 
of “EU countries”, we mean to include also non-EU countries which apply EC261. 
9 Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH (C-402/07) 
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compensation. Over time, so–called “claims agencies” proliferated. These agencies charge a 
contingency fee to distressed passengers and credibly threaten to sue airlines in case of non-compliance 
with the Sturgeon ruling. Over time, these developments made the initial opposition of airlines 
untenable, and rising public awareness may have caused an increase in claims.10 Due to this gradual 
implementation, before/after analyses are not feasible to assess the impact of EC261.  
European Passenger rights in case of delay are exceptionally strong compared to other major aviation 
markets (see ICAO (2013) for a survey) or other modes of transport. In the US, the Department of 
Transportation relies on the market, aided by its delay transparency program, to deal with flight delay.11 
Its Consumer Guide to Air Travel informs passengers that “there are no federal requirements” for 
assistance or care in case of delays; passengers are advised to take note of each airline’s “own policies” 
and engage in “defensive planning”. Notably, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and New Zealand 
introduced passenger rights legislation including assistance and compensation in case of long delays; 
however, their specific regulations are beyond the scope of the present paper. From a global perspective, 
the potential of airline passenger rights is still largely untapped. 
Airlines sometimes implement voluntary approaches to ease the burden on passengers affected by 
extreme delays. In the US, some airlines offer discounted hotel accommodation in case of delay 
(“distressed passenger rate”). Others encourage consumers to purchase third-party travel insurance, 
which may provide assistance in case of delay. Finally, some airlines offer delay insurance as an 
ancillary purchase, perhaps to signal their reliability. For example, one European low-cost carrier offers 
an “On-time Guarantee” at a charge of EUR 10; in case of a delay exceeding one hour, the “guarantee” 
pays EUR 100 in flight vouchers to the consumer. Clearly, the protection offered here is more limited 
than under EC261; whether this reflects a market failure or simply low consumer demand for insurance 
is a separate issue we do not seek to tackle here. 
2. Identifying the EC261 Effect 
Our cross-sectional unit is a flight number, indexed f, and time unit t is a calendar day. For each flight 
number, we observe the Routef on which it is operated, and whether this route starts in a non-EU airport 
and terminates in an EU airport (denoted by EU-boundf). We also have the Airlinef which is operating 
the flight as well as whether this airline is “Community Carrier” under EC261 (denoted by EUCarrierf), 
and whether the flight departs from an airline hub, denoted FromHubf. 
Then our primary estimating equation follows a fixed effects strategy and is given by  
 
yft = βEUCarrierf × 𝐸𝑈 − 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓 + 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑓𝑡 is our dependent variable of interest, primarily gate departure delay. Our main goal is to 
estimate β, the impact of being covered by the EC261 which is estimated using within-route variations 
in coverage on EU-bound flights, as discussed above. We allow for airline fixed effects to capture innate 
differences between them, which is standard. Moreover, we allow for a route-time fixed effect, which 
controls for transient, route-specific factors such as airspace congestion or local conditions at either 
arrival or departure airport; these fixed effects also absorb the effect of EC261 on routes departing from 
EU, where there is no variation in coverage. 
                                                     
10 Airlines do not publish information on claim rates. The European Commission estimates that only approximately 10% of 
eligible passengers request compensation. 
11 However, the US Civil Aviation Authority created a right to compensation in case of denied boarding in 2011, which 
follows the EC261 model for this specific liability event. 
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Inclusion of route-time fixed effects is a particular luxury of our setting because our variation is 
within the route-time dimension, while other airline delay studies typically explore market or policy 
changes collinear with route-time. Controlling for route-time fixed effects is especially crucial in the 
European setting and the European slot control system.12 Due to route-time fixed effects, standard 
controls such as weather, airport concentration, congestion indices or demographic variables, are not 
required. Instead, we have to control for possible confounding factors that are correlated with 
𝛽𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑓 × 𝐸𝑈 − 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓 after removing airline and route-day group means.  
Based on the literature, the need to control for airline-hub status is clear. Mayer and Sinai (2003) 
conduct a study of determinants of excess travel time for US domestic flights; after controlling for 
airport-level covariates (airport hub size and airport concentration), which in our design would be 
absorbed by route-time FEs, they find that airline hubbing is a significant determinant of excess travel 
time.13 Furthermore, Rupp (2009) conducts a study with similar controls but using departure delay as a 
dependent variable, which is most closely related to our dependent variable. His results indicate a 
statistically significant increase in departure delay from airline hubs of over two minutes; hub status at 
destination has no impact on departure delay.14 
Our baseline control strategy is to include an airline-hub indicator. This takes the value one if a 
carrier is operating connecting flights from a given airport. In other words, connections operated by 
code-share are not considered hubbing; if we were to broaden the definition in this direction, the airline-
hub dummy would nearly always take the value of one. This specification is consistent with Mayer and 
Sinai (2003), who find the hub effect to be statistically indistinguishable between medium and large 
airline hubs.15 
2.1 Sources of Variation 
We have considerable variation in EC261 coverage, with around half of inbound EU flights not covered, 
but there is some collinearity of the treatment with airline hub status. This arises from the legacy airline 
model, where “flag carriers” operate hubs in their home countries, and start international flights from 
these hubs. Hence, on a route originating outside the EU, legacy EU carriers never depart from a hub, 
while legacy foreign carriers always do. Hence our variation in coverage, , is colinear with a combination 
of airline and route fixed effects as well as the hub indicator among legacy carriers. This can cause a 
loss of precision, as it becomes harder for the model to disentangle EC261 and the hub effect. 
It is possible to rely on the limited within-variation in hubbing structure created by carriers operating 
purely point-to-point (P2P) models to disentangle these two effects. These carriers do not operate 
connecting flights, and hence fail to satisfy the classical definition of a hub. This breaks the 
multicollinearity and makes it possible to estimate the model. However, this source of variation is 
                                                     
12 To reduce environmental pollution and increase safety, European air traffic control (ATC) works according to a slot control 
system. Under this system, ATC assigns a Calculated Time of Take Off (CTOT) taking into account expected conditions 
at the arrival airport based upon the predicted time of arrival. The objective of this system is to reduce the time planes spend 
flying in a “holding pattern” over the arrival airport while waiting for a landing slot (see Eurocontrol (2016)) An important 
consequence is that a departure in, say, Miami, may be delayed due to expected congestion in Heathrow 9 hours later. Since 
Heathrow is one of the most congested airports in Europe, the ability to include route-time fixed effects is particularly 
valuable for our present study. 
13 Determinants of delay are similar in Europe but coefficients differ, according to Santos and Robin (2010), who use a similar 
study design. 
14 See table 6 in Rupp (2009) 
15 Due to the focus of our sample on most traffic-intensive routes, we do not have small hubs in the dataset. 
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limited – the bulk of flights on long-haul routes are accounted for by legacy carriers – and the particular 
airlines may not be typical.16 Hence it is not satisfactory to rely on this variation alone. 
Secondly, we include additional routes not subject to EC261 to get more data which can tie down the 
hub effect. On US domestic routes, where flight data are easily available from the Department of 
Transportation, the EC261 treatment is always zero but we have strong variation in hub status. Thus, we 
extend our sample with domestic flights of US carriers among the US airports. The selection criterion 
is that both the carrier and each airport should already be included in the sample. This creates separate 
variation which ties down the hub effect. For robustness, we also allow the airline-hub effect to vary by 
airline.17 
EC261 creates small variations in coverage across domestic EU markets, and large variation in 
coverage within markets that involve a non–EU airport. For EU–domestic flights, rights to care always 
apply, although the size of the compensation for lost flights increases discontinuously when the distance 
exceeds 1500km. Exploiting this variation is difficult, as it would be collinear with route-fixed effects. 
For this reason, we focus on within-route variation on international routes with one leg outside the EU.  
3. Data 
We define each airport pair as a transportation market, which consists of two directional routes. 
3.1 Flight Data: Extra-EU Routes 
We have collected scheduled and actual flight times of all scheduled commercial flights on the top 15 
most traffic intensive extra-EU markets over an 8-month sample period. The choice is driven by a trade-
off between statistical power and cost, as flight data must be purchased commercially. 
Based on Eurostat data, we obtain number of passengers carried by transportation market in 2016.18 
The leading international routes are entirely “category 3” flights (i.e. extra-EU over 3500km), with one 
exception.19 To make sure that the EC261 is uniform throughout the sample, we limit our attention to 
category 3 markets only. The full map of extra-EU routes considered in the sample is shown in figure 
2. 
We obtain scheduled and actual flight data from FlightAware, a commercial vendor. The sample 
period, which is determined by the time of data collection only, runs from 4th November 2016 to 6th 
July 2017. Flight schedule information is based on airline data available to the vendor. Actual flight data 
are collected by the vendor from two sources. Actual gate departure and gate arrival times are based on 
airline-reported times. Take-off and landing times are based on satellite position data the vendor 
obtained from the ADS-B system, a radio transponder installed on all commercial aircrafts.20 
  
                                                     
16 In our baseline sample, point-to-point models appear in conjunction with new carriers (i.e. who were not previously legacy 
carriers) and fifth-freedom flights, as discussed below. 
17 We thank Ricard Gil for suggesting this. 
18 Database: avia_par 
19 The exception is Düsseldorf-Antalya, which is top 15 in terms of passenger volume but has a great circle distance below 
2500km (i.e. a category 2 flight). This route has been replaced in our data set with the 16th most busy extra-EU market; 
London Heathrow – Newark. 
20 Collection of individual flight data is crowd-sourced to thousands of radio enthusiasts around the world. Data collectors 
equipped with simple, often home-made radio receivers can track signal from all aircrafts up to 150 miles away. The signal 
is then sent to a flight data provider, processed, and published on-line. 
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Figure 2: Map of Extra-EU Routes 
 
Notes: For airport codes, see table 4 
Source: Authors. 
We then apply a data cleaning procedure following Forbes et al. (2015) on this data set: first, we remove 
all flights with incomplete flight data21 and those which did not reach their destination (due to diversion 
or cancellation). Second, we drop all flights where the actual gate departure precedes the scheduled gate 
departure by more than 15 minutes or which arrive more than 60 minutes ahead of schedule; these 
observations likely represented corrupted data (e.g. due to rescheduling). Finally, we limit the sample 
to carriers for which data on flights on more than one route are available. This leaves us a total of 48426 
flights. 
We supplement the flight data with a list of hub airports for each carrier in the sample, according to 
the hub definition outlined in the previous section (see appendix table 4 for details). Flight volume and 
the number of carriers active are highly variable depending on the transportation market. Figure 2 and 
appendix tables 4 and 5 show the details. Some markets, typically with high passenger volume, 
experienced entry, including by the EU based point-to-point carrier Virgin Atlantic. The former is 
crucial for identifying the hub effect. As shown in appendix table 6, those flights cover for 20% of the 
EU-outbound flights operated by an EU-carrier. An additional source of variation comes from so-called 
“fifth freedom” flights, i.e. flights between foreign countries as a part of services connecting the airline’s 
own country. Air New Zealand, for example, operates a connection from Los Angeles to Auckland with 
a stopover in London Heathrow.22 The “fifth freedom” flights make up 2% of the EU-bound flights 
operated by a non-EU carrier that do not depart from a hub. 
Furthermore, the descriptive tables show considerable variation in competition. US markets, for 
example, have at least three carriers – two US, one European – while many Asian and Canadian markets 
still have only two carriers. This variation in competition will be useful later on to assess how regulation 
interacts with the intensity of market competition. 
                                                     
21 A complete flight record contains information on the following key flight phases: scheduled gate departure, actual gate 
departure, take-off, landing, actual gate arrival and scheduled gate arrival time. 
22 Importantly, these stopovers do not serve only refueling, as airlines operating the “fifth freedom” flights are allowed to sell 
tickets for each leg separately. 
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3.2 Flight Data: US Domestic Routes 
To create more within-airline hub variation to improve our control strategy for the hub effect discussed 
above, we obtain flight-level data for US domestic flights from the US Department of Transportation 
for the entire sample period. Specifically, we include data on all flights operated by all (three) US-based 
carriers between all (six) US airports in our main sample; 88731 flights in total. This dataset contains 
the same variables as our FlightAware data set for extra-EU flights. We apply also the same data 
cleaning procedure as mentioned above. The US legacy carriers typically operate from multiple hubs; 
nevertheless, 14% of the US domestic flights in our sample were not operated from carrier’s hub.  
On average, flight quality measures are very similar in both samples. 74.4% of the extra-EU long-
haul flights arrive within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival. The score for the US domestic flights is 
only 1.3% lower. The US domestic flights, however, have longer average departure (14.9 min vs 9.3 
min) and arrival delays (7.4 min vs 3.7 min). 
We compute our baseline estimates combining the two data sets, which contain 137157 observations 
in total. 
4. Results: Delay Impact of EC261  
We find an economically important and statistically significant effect of EC261 regulation on both 
departure and arrival delay, as well as on-time performance. Estimation results are presented in table 1, 
where column (1) reports results for departure delay. Our model attributes a delay reduction of 4.92 
minutes on average to the EC261 regulation, after controlling for airline-hub status, route-time fixed 
effects and airline fixed effects. This estimate is certainly large compared to an average departure delay 
of 10 minutes on international routes, and economically important. Statistically, we can very robustly 
reject the hypothesis of no effect (at the 1% level). However, the standard error is relatively large at 1.11 
minutes, so there is some uncertainty associated with the precise magnitude of the effect. The same 
holds for arrival delay, where the estimated EC261 impact is 3.90 minutes of delay reduction. As column 
(3) shows, EC261 is associated with a 5% improvement in “on-time performance” (i.e. whether arrival 
delay is below 15 minutes). Finally, for delays exceeding three hours, the coefficient estimate is low 
with high standard error; this imprecision is not surprising, because only 0.5% of extra-EU flights in our 
sample arrive that late. 
These results suggest that EC261 has an important impact on flight quality through improving mean 
performance, rather than reducing the likelihood of extremely poor performance. At first pass this 
appears surprising because the liability events under the regulation focus on long delays. However, it is 
important to note that delay at final destination is what matters for the regulation; carriers operating 
connecting flights have a strong incentive to make sure their passengers don’t miss connections. This 
suggests one source of heterogeneity in the EC261 effect, since carriers offering point-to-point service 
only do not face this incentive. 
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Table 1: Delay Impact of EC261 
Dependent 
Variable 
Departure 
Delay 
(minutes) 
 
Arrival 
Delay 
(minutes) 
 Arrival 
On time 
 
Arrival 
Delay 
>180min     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EU-boundf × EU 
Carrierf -4.92  -3.9  0.054  -0.004 
 (1.11)  (1.20)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
From Hubf 3.6  3.31  -0.046  -0.002 
 (0.53)  (0.58)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Num. obs. 137157  137157  137157  137157 
R2 (full model) 0.25  0.31  0.28  0.31 
 
Notes: All regressions include airline and route-day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the route-day level. 
Arrival on time and Arrival delay >180 are binary variables that takes value one if a flight arrives within 15 minutes of 
the scheduled arrival time and over 180 minutes after the scheduled arrival time respectively, and zero otherwise.  
Source: Authors.  
The baseline results are robust to changes in the estimation sample. Our baseline results are based on 
the full sample, which complements extra-EU flights with US domestic flights. In appendix table 7, we 
estimate the same departure delay specification, but splitting the sample according to the sources of 
variation identified in the previous section. The point estimates in a subsample restricted to the extra-
EU flights only show a smaller EC261 effect, and a larger hub effect. However, precision suffers due to 
the multicollinearity issues discussed above. Restricting the sample even further to the EU-US routes 
only does not significantly affect the point estimates. Excluding point-to-point carriers from the main 
sample leads to a much larger EC261 effect on delay, consistent with connecting passengers being an 
important part of the EC261 incentives. Throughout all specifications, the hypothesis of differences of 
coefficients between the subsamples can be statistically rejected at standard significance levels. 
These results are also robust to changes in specification. One possible generalization is to allow the 
hub effect to vary by airline, e.g. because connecting flights are operated differently. Columns (1-2) of 
appendix table 9 contains results for this specification. Given the nature of our dataset, we have within 
airline-hub variation for EU-US transportation markets; thus, the other routes do not contribute to the 
estimate of EC261 impact under this specification. Hence, the results of this specification should be 
compared to column 5 of table 2; the differences in coefficients are small in magnitude and not 
statistically significant. As a further robustness test, we replace the route-day fixed effect with a route-
time fixed effect in columns (3-4) of the table. For each route, we split flights into time windows with a 
duration not exceeding 60 minutes according to an optimal matching algorithm; each time window must 
contain at least one EU carrier and one non-EU carrier. Hence, the route-time fixed effect can capture 
even very short term systemic delay causes. Adopting this specification considerably increases, which 
is not surprising, and does not significantly affect the estimated EC261 coefficients. However, due to 
the invariably smaller sample size, precision suffers. Hence, in the following regressions, we return to 
the baseline specification with a hub dummy variable and a route-day fixed effect. 
Delay reductions of EC261 cannot be explained by “gaming”, such as airlines strategically increasing 
scheduled flight times or affecting other flight phases (see figure 3 for details) to reduce measured delay. 
On the one hand, the fact that EC261 has a strong effect on departure delay already rules out schedule 
padding as an alternative explanation. Indeed, as shown in the Appendix table 8, the airlines affected by 
the EC261 regulation actually operate on tighter schedules than their unregulated competitors. EU 
legacy carriers schedule their flights back to Europe to be 4.5 minutes shorter than their foreign legacy 
competitors. As the remaining columns of the table show, EU carriers also have actually shorter in-air 
times and shorter taxi-in times. This is likely due to a combination of two factors: on the one hand, fleet 
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effects – some planes fly faster than others – may explain the shorter in-air time.23 Secondly, more 
favourable positioning of terminals (relative to runways) reduces taxi-in times; the pattern we observe 
could be explained by airlines having more favourable locations in their home airports as compared to 
foreign airlines operating from the same airport. 
These results provide strong evidence that EC261 leads to a meaningful improvement in airline 
service quality. This improvement was driven by a reduction in mean delay both at the gate departure 
and gate arrival level, rather than a reduction in the probability of severe delay only. Accordingly, there 
is evidence for improved on-time performance, defined as 15 minutes arrival delay or less and limited 
evidence of a reduction in extreme delays (defined as delays exceeding three hours). Moreover, there is 
some evidence that the effect is heterogeneous across carriers: excluding point-to-point carriers from 
the sample leads to an even stronger EC261 effect. In the analysis that follows, we explore more closely 
how the EC261 impact interacts with airline and transportation market characteristics. 
5. Discussion: What drives EC261 Impact?  
To better understand the driver of EC261 impact, this section investigates heterogeneity according to 
airline and transportation market characteristics. Our discussion is organized around the results shown 
in table 2. 
Due to the regulatory focus on delay “at final destination”, EC261 affects legacy airlines more 
strongly than point-to-point carriers. As column (1) of table 2 shows, this is reflected in a weaker EC261 
delay reduction impact on point-to-point carriers as compared to legacy ones. By the point estimates, 
the delay reduction is around 25% smaller for point-to-point carriers. Although the estimate is not 
statistically significant, this is not entirely surprising given the relatively small market share of point-to-
point in the transportation markets we consider.  
Routes with weaker competition have a stronger EC261 impact. Prior research has found mixed 
results on competition and airline service quality; e.g. Mazzeo (2003) found that competition increases 
service quality, while Ater and Orlov (2015) found that competition actually increases delays. How 
regulation interacts with market competition is similarly an open question. One possible mechanism is 
that under low competition, airlines exert little effort to reduce delays. In this case, the marginal cost of 
delay reduction is likely to be low, and the regulation can have a significant effect. We test this 
hypothesis by interacting the EC261 effect with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, bearing in mind the 
limitations of our sample which contains only 15 markets affected by EC261. We first add a linear 
interaction between the route Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the EC261 effect. The results are 
presented in column (2) of table 2. The estimate favors a linear relationship between the route 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and EC261 effect. Given the distribution of HHI in the sample, the effect 
ranges from 2.53 minutes of delay reduction on the most competitive routes to 7.78 minutes on the least 
competitive routes. As a robustness test, we interact the EC261 with an indicator if the route HHI 
exceeds the median HHI in column (3). This yields essentially the same results. Thus, there is evidence 
of a negative interaction between market competitiveness and the impact of EC261. 
                                                     
23 Conditional on aircraft type, the freedom to choose cruise speed at will is limited. On the one hand, slot control system at 
congested airports requires airlines to assess the flight time before departure. On the other hand, fuel economy and 
technological considerations play a role. For a typical airliner, the range between the cruising and maximum speed is rather 
narrow, making it difficult for airlines to reduce flight delay after take-off. Airbus A340-642 flying between London and 
New York (5555km) a speed increase from the aircraft’s cruising speed (0.82M or 871 km/h) to the maximum speed 
allowed by the aircraft producer (0.86M or 914 km/h) decreases the flight time only by 17min (or 4%). This reduction 
comes, however, at quite a substantial cost. Fuel consumption increases by more than 20% or 10 tonnes of jet fuel, which 
would cost more than $20,000 extra (simulation performed using freeware Aircraft Emissions and Performance software 
Piano-X (available at http://www.piano.aero/)). 
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Table 2: EC261: Heterogeneity of Delay Impact 
Dependent Variable Departure Delay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
EU-boundf × EU 
Carrierf -5.56 -0.34 -3.79 -4.58 -2.2 
 (1.35) (2.09) (1.24) (2.00) (1.29) 
 × Point-to-Point 
Carrierf 1.46     
 (1.05)     
 × Route HHIf -11.51    
  (4.45)    
 × (Route HHI>Median HHI)f -2.31   
   (1.08)   
 × (UK Market)f   -0.37  
    (1.81)  
 × (North Am. Market)f   -4.12 
     (1.15) 
From Hubf 3.4 3.54 3.57 3.61 3.65 
 (0.60) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
Num. obs. 137157 137157 137157 137157 137157 
R2 (full model) 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Notes: All regressions include airline and route-day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the route-day level 
Source: Authors.  
Enforcement of EC261 is national, although the letter of the regulation applies uniformly across the EU. 
In the legal literature, the role of national differences in implementation of regulations is frequently 
debated (e.g. Bobek and Prassl (2016)). Our sample only contains two EU member states, so our power 
to reject equal effects across EU member states is low. We could expect to reject the hypothesis only if 
the true heterogeneity is very large. This does not appear to be the case: column (4) shows no evidence 
of heterogeneity in enforcement, at least between the UK and France. 
Lastly, we consider heterogeneity by non-EU region. This is potentially important, because the 
population of non-EU carriers is significantly different across regions. Several Asian carriers have 
successfully pursued a strategy of product differentiation offering higher service quality than European 
and North American legacy carriers. Partly, this is to make the carriers more attractive to connecting 
passengers, an especially important factor for the Gulf airlines. Therefore, these airlines may be exerting 
high effort to avoid delays, at a similar level as regulated European airlines, even in the absence of 
EC261 coverage. To test this hypothesis, column (5) interacts the EC261 with a dummy indicating if 
the non-EU region is in North America. This seems to be a very powerful discriminator: the impact of 
EC261 on non-North American routes becomes small and statistically insignificant, while the impact on 
North American markets becomes even larger and statistically more powerful. 
6. Conclusion 
Consumer rights legislation has rapidly proliferated in the European Union, and covers many sectors of 
the economy. Besides passenger rights, examples include a statutory minimum warranty period for 
consumer durables, a consumer’s right to repay a credit early or a “cooling off period” to change one’s 
mind about an online purchase. These regulations increasingly constrain the freedom of contracts 
between firms and consumers. But little is known about the impact of these laws, whether directly on 
consumers with a grievance or indirectly through changes in industry service quality. This paper begins 
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to fill the void by studying the impact of a specific form of consumer rights regulation, air passenger 
rights, on service quality within the affected industry. 
We exploit the partial application of regulation EC261 on routes bound for EU but originating outside 
the bloc. On these routes, carriers from the EU are covered by the regulation, while foreign carriers are 
not; in contrast, on routes originating in the EU, all carriers are covered. This variation in coverage 
makes a difference-in-differences strategy feasible.  
We find robust evidence that the regulation is effective in improving airline punctuality. Our baseline 
regression focuses on gate departure delay, because this measure – unlike arrival delay – is not affected 
by scheduled flight time, which is chosen by the airline. This model shows a delay reduction of nearly 
five minutes due to the regulation; for arrival delay, we obtain qualitatively the same result, but the point 
estimate is smaller (3.9 minutes). The regulation also leads to a 5% improvement in “on-time” 
performance. In further analysis, we find the regulation to have a weaker effect on point-to-point 
carriers, and a stronger effect on routes with weak competition. 
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7. Appendix 
Table 3: Monetary Compensation for Lost Time under EC261 
   Route 
Flight 
Category 
Distance 
(km) Delay intra EU extra EU 
1 ≤1500 ≥3h EUR 250 EUR 250 
2 1500 – 3500 ≥3h EUR 400 EUR 400 
3 > 3500 3h-4h EUR 400 EUR 300 
  ≥4h EUR 400 EUR 600 
Source: Compiled by authors based on European Union (2016) 
Table 4: Carriers 
Airline 
Airline 
(IATA 
codes) 
EU 
Carrier  
Unique 
routes  
Observation 
count Airline Hubs 
Extra-EU flights: 
British Airways BA YES 24 13668 LHR 
American Airlines AA NO 10 5562 JFK, LAX, MIA, ORD 
United Airlines UA NO 8 5003 EWR, LAX, ORD, SFO 
Virgin Atlantic VS YES 16 4388  
Emirates EK NO 4 4087 DXB 
Air France AF YES 6 3027 CDG 
Air Canada AC NO 4 2291 YUL, YYZ 
Qatar Airways QR NO 2 2226 DOH 
Delta Air Lines DL NO 4 2096 JFK, LAX 
Cathay Pacific CX NO 2 2048 HKG 
Singapore 
Airlines SQ NO 2 1826 SIN 
Air India AI NO 4 1073 DEL 
Jet Airways 9W NO 2 469 DEL 
Air New Zealand NZ NO 2 429  
Qantas QF NO 2 233  
US domestic flights: 
American Airlines AA NO 18 41586 JFK, LAX, MIA, ORD 
United Airlines UA NO 24 34467 EWR, LAX, ORD, SFO 
Delta Air Lines DL NO 10 12678 JFK, LAX 
Airport IATA codes extensions are as follows CDG - Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, LHR – London Heathrow airport, 
DXB - Dubai International Airport, JFK - New York John F. Kennedy International Airport, YUL - Montréal–Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau International Airport, DEL - New Delhi Indira Gandhi International Airport , DOH - Doha Hamad 
International Airport, EWR - Newark Liberty International Airport, HKG - Hong Kong International Airport, LAX - 
Los Angeles International Airport, MIA – Miami International Airport, ORD - Chicago O’Hare International Airport, 
SFO - San Francisco International Airport, SIN - Singapore Changi Airport, YYZ - Toronto Pearson International 
Airport.  
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Table 5: Routes 
Extra - EU US domestic 
Market Airlines 
Num. 
obs. Market Airlines 
Num. 
obs. 
CDG DXB AF, EK 1757 EWR LAX UA 6133 
CDG JFK AA, AF, DL 2732 EWR MIA AA, UA 4567 
CDG YUL AC, AF 1394 EWR ORD UA, AA 6140 
LHR DEL AI, BA, 9W, VS 2785 EWR SFO UA 7502 
LHR DOH BA, QR 2905 JFK LAX AA, DL 10509 
LHR DXB BA, QF*, EK, VS 4757 JFK MIA AA, DL 5366 
LHR EWR AI*, BA, UA, VS 3646 JFK ORD AA 526 
LHR HKG BA, CX, VS 3188 JFK SFO AA, DL 6136 
LHR JFK AA, BA, DL, VS 8199 LAX MIA AA, DL 4621 
LHR LAX AA, NZ*, BA, UA, VS 3386 LAX ORD UA, AA 9786 
LHR MIA AA, BA, VS 2005 LAX SFO 
UA, AA, 
DL 9316 
LHR ORD AA, BA, UA 3728 MIA ORD UA, AA 6540 
LHR SFO BA, UA, VS 2475 MIA SFO AA, UA 2402 
LHR SIN BA, SQ 2735 ORD SFO UA, AA 9187 
LHR YYZ AC, BA 2734       
IATA airline code and airport extensions listed in this table are shown in table 4. Airlines annotated with * serve a given 
market under 5th freedom of the air provisions. 
  
Hinnerk Gnutzmann and Piotr Śpiewanowski 
16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Main Regression Samples 
Variable 
EU 
Bound 
EU 
Carrier Mean SD Min Max 
Departure Delay No No 5.97 25.31 -15 342 
(min) No Yes 11.45 24.29 -15 320 
 Yes No 12.77 31.26 -15 339 
 Yes Yes 6.65 25.4 -15 328 
 US Domestic 14.88 39.31 -15 345 
Arrival Delay No No -0.99 32.78 -60 332 
(min) No Yes 2.4 29.95 -60 315 
 Yes No 8.65 35.76 -60 337 
 Yes Yes 4.1 29.67 -58 331 
 US Domestic 7.94 43.26 -60 348 
On time arrival No No 0.78 0.41 0 1 
(dummy indicating No Yes 0.74 0.44 0 1 
arrival delay  Yes No 0.69 0.46 0 1 
< 15 min) Yes Yes 0.77 0.42 0 1 
 US Domestic 0.73 0.44 0 1 
From hub No No 0 0 0 0 
(dummy indicating No Yes 0.8 0.4 0 1 
airline hub at Yes No 0.98 0.15 0 1 
departure airport) Yes Yes 0 0 0 0 
  US Domestic 0.86 0.34 0 1 
Source: DoT and Flight Aware. Data in rows marked as US Domestic represents US Domestic flights and is sourced 
from the US Department of Transport data base. The remaining rows represent extra-EU flights sourced from Flight 
Aware (flightaware.com) 
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Table 7: Delay Impact of EC261: Impact of Sample Coverage 
Dependent Variable Departure Delay  Arrival Delay 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient Estimates       
EU-boundf × EU 
Carrierf 
-3.19 -6.74 -3.63  -3.97 -6.45 -7.63 
(1.53) (1.57) (1.83)  (1.72) (1.68) (2.02) 
From Hubf 4.57 3.37 5.1  3.27 3.31 2.95 
 (0.83) (0.62) (1.02)  (0.93) (0.66) (1.12) 
Sample Coverage        
Routes        
EU-US       
Other Extra-EU       
US Domestic      
Carriers      
Legacy Carriers       
Point-to-Point       
Num. obs. 48426 111040 26171  48426 111040 26171 
R2 (full model) 0.25 0.22 0.23   0.38 0.30 0.36 
 
Figure 3: Anatomy of a Flight Delay: Measurement, Proximate Causes and Mitigation 
 
Source: Compiled by authors  
Table 8: Impact of EC261 and Flight Phases  
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Dependent Variable 
Scheduled 
Duration  
Taxi-
out  In-air  Taxi-in 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EU-boundf×EU 
Carrierf -5.9  2.44  -3.15  -4.17 
 (0.30)  (0.27)  (0.31)  (0.26) 
From Hubf -1.38  1.19  -1.4  -1.46 
 (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Num. obs. 137157  137157  137157  137157 
R2 (full model) 1.00   0.32   1.00   0.27 
Source: Authors. All regressions include airline and route-day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the route-
day level.  
Table 9: Further Robustness Tests 
 Airline-Hub FEs  Route-Time Matching 
 Dep. Delay Arr. Delay Dep. Delay Arr. Delay 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
EU-boundf × EU 
Carrierf -5.5 -5.99  -5.04 -5.65 
 (1.17) (1.27)  -2.58 -2.76 
From Hubf    4.68 3.2 
    (1.44) (1.54) 
Num. obs. 137157 137157  26754 26754 
R2 (full model) 0.23 0.31  0.51 0.61 
Source: In models (1) and (2), we allow the hub effect to vary by airline, essentially creating an airline-hub fixed effect. 
In models (3) and (4), we replace the route-day fixed effect with a route-time four hour window. All regressions include 
airline fixed effects and standard errors clustered by route-time.  
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